Detalles«The Emergence of Mind in a Physical World» presents an ontologically and methodologically well founded Physicalist proposal that does not lose sight of the special particularity and alleged irreducibility of some of the most obvious phenomena of our existence, such as the human mind. The author provides a compelling argument against the most widely accepted interpretation of Physicalism, Microphysicalism, highlighting its deep empirical and conceptual problems, as well as an insightful response to the reiterated critiques leveled by some reductionist philosophers, especially Jaegwon Kim, at the non-reductive physicalist explanation of the causal relevance of mental and higher level properties. Morales argues in favor of Emergentism as a non-reductive physicalist proposal that explains the causal reality of higher-level properties as metaphysically dependent but not supervenient on their microphysical bases. This novel interpretation will be of great interest to scholars working in the field of philosophy of mind.
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Editor / Marca Universidad Nacional de Colombia Ciudad Bogota Facultad Ciencias Humanas Año de Edición 2018 Número de Páginas 232 Idioma(s) Español Terminado Tapa rustica Alto y ancho 16.5 x 24 cm Peso 0.2500 Tipo Producto libro Colección General Biblioteca Abierta PDF URL
Juan Diego Morales Otero
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- AcknowledgmentsIntroductionChapter 1. Causation: A Non-Reductive ApproachThe Nature of Causal EntitiesCausation and Laws of NatureCounterfactual Theory of CausationCausation and LocalityProbability and InterventionCausal Context and the Possibility of Causation in the Special SciencesSummaryChapter 2. The Concept of the Physical and the Overcoming of the Supervenience TheoryWhat Physicalism IsPhysicalism as a Contingent TheoryWhat Is It To Be Physical"'Microphysical Supervenience as the Criterion for the PhysicalThe Empirical Failure of MicrophysicalismConsequences for Determining the Concept of the PhysicalFinding a Solution to our ProblemSummaryChapter 3. Emergentism as Type MacrophysicalismThe Idea of Ontological EmergenceEmergentism as Type MacrophysicalismReductive and Non-Reductive MicrophysicalismProperty Dualism and Contingent ConnectionsEmergence and Metaphysical DependenceTwo Types of Ontological EmergenceSummaryChapter 4. Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Problem of Causation in the Special SciencesSupervenience and Multiple RealizabilityThe Causal Exclusion ArgumentThe Supervenience ArgumentThe Principle of Physical Causal ClosureThe Exclusion PrincipleThe Interventionist Account of ExclusionThe Argument of Causal Individuation of Natural KindsHigher Causal Powers as Identical to Lower Causal PowersThe Subset Account of RealizationSummaryChapter 5. Emergent, Downward, and Mental CausationThe Idea of Emergent CausationThe Principle of Physical Causal Closure of EmergentismEmergent and Lower Level Causal PowersTesting the Causal Relevance of Higher Level PropertiesEmergent Causation at the Quantum LevelMental Causation as Emergent CausationSummaryAppendix: Functional Reduction of the Special PropertiesConclusionReferencesIndex